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NOTE
Overriding a Constitutional Governor: The Supreme Court's
Application of the Impeachment Exception in Michigan v.
Harvey to the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
More than 25 years ago, the United States Supreme Court announced the
rule that, once formal criminal proceedings begin, the sixth amendment1 renders
inadmissible at trial information that the State deliberately elicits from the de-
fendant in the absence of counsel.2 This decision extended to sixth amendment
cases the exclusionary rule that the Supreme Court previously had applied only
to the fruits of illegal search and seizure.3 Since that time, the Court has ex-
tended use of the rule to preclude admission of statements obtained in violation
of either the fifth amendment or the procedural protections established in Mi-
randa v. Arizona 4 to safeguard the fifth amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination.5 Although the rule protects individual constitutional rights,
its resulting exclusion of reliable evidence inhibits the truth-seeking purpose of
the American courts. To resolve the tension between use of the exclusionary
rule and the judicial system's interest in preventing perjury, the Court has cre-
ated an impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception allows
the prosecution to use some types of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
or fifth amendments to attack the credibility of the defendant's testimony. 6 Un-
1. The pertinent sixth amendment provision, often termed the right to counsel clause, states
that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
3. See, eg., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (explicitly recognizing the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (prohibiting use of evidence ob-
tained without a search warrant in a location several blocks away from defendant's place of arrest);
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (preventing admission of papers obtained surrepti-
tiously, without force); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (prohibiting
admission of corporate documents obtained during an unlawful search and seizure); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (mandating exclusion of evidence resulting from unreasonable searches
and seizures). The fourth amendment provides in part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. 384 U.S. 436, 467-77 (1966). Miranda requires police to inform people that they have the
right to remain silent when taken into custody; that anything they say can and will be used against
them in court; that they have a right to consult with a lawyer; and that the government will appoint
a lawyer for them if they are indigent. Id. at 467-73. Once police give these warnings, they must
cease interrogation if, at any time, a person indicates that he wishes to remain silent. Id. at 473-74.
Moreover, the government carries the heavy burden of establishing that an individual has waived his
Miranda rights. Id. at 475-77.
5. The pertinent provisions of the fifth amendment state that "[n]o peron... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of... liberty ... without
due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S 620, 627-28 (1980) (The Havens Court announced an
exception to the exclusionary rule that allows use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment to discredit a defendant's testimony on cross-examination. Previously the Court only
allowed evidence taken in violation of the fourth amendment to impeach the defendant on direct
examination.); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (evidence violative of fifth amendment
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til recently, however, the Court had never addressed whether statements ob-
tained in violation of an accused's sixth amendment right to counsel are
admissible for impeachment purposes.
Michigan v. Harvey7 represents the first qualification of the sixth amend-
ment exclusionary rule to allow impeachment evidence. The Court held in Har-
vey that at trial the prosecution may introduce evidence obtained in violation of
a prophylactic safeguard to impeach the defendant's testimony, but maintained
its position that evidence violating the Constitution itself can never be admissi-
ble.8 Despite dissent from four justices,9 the majority furthers the Court's ana-
lytical analogy between the exclusionary rule's application in sixth amendment
contexts and its use in fifth amendment self-incrimination cases,10 The Court's
application of the impeachment exception to the sixth amendment's exclusion-
ary rule reflects its belief that the Constitution does not preclude the use of ille-
gally obtained evidence in all situations.1 1 Rather, when a court finds that the
police have violated only a prophylactic rule, the determination to exclude or
admit illegally obtained evidence depends on balancing the judicial system's in-
terest in seeking the truth against society's interest in preventing coercive law
enforcement investigations. 12
This Note analyzes the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Harvey,13 the case's relationship to prior cases developing the exclusionary
rule, 14 and the competing theories governing the application of the rule to sixth
amendment cases.1 5 The Note concludes that, although Harvey is consistent
with the balancing approach taken by the Court with respect to the exclusionary
rule in fourth and fifth amendment cases, the majority fails to give full consider-
ation to the principle that the Constitution requires exclusion of evidence ob-
tained in contravention of the sixth amendment, regardless of its purpose,
including its use for impeachment.' 6
More than two months after a Michigan district court arraigned defendant
Tyris Lemont Harvey on rape charges and appointed counsel for him, Harvey
admissible for impeachment purposes); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (allowing
evidence in violation of fifth amendment for impeachment purposes); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (allowing evidence in violation of fourth amendment to impeach direct testi-
mony); see also infra notes 105-30 and accompanying text.
7. 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990).
8. Id. at 1181. For a discussion of the meaning of the word "prophylactic" see infra note 26.
9. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1182 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens authored the dissent
with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joining.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 30-45.
11. Harvey, 110 S. CL at 1181. The Court deemed admission of only one type of evidence
impermissible under any circumstance. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459-60 (1979)
(proscribing use at trial of coerced statements for impeachment purposes under due process clauses
of fifth and fourteenth amendments); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (holding
that "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process
of law...." (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964) (emphasis in original))).
12. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1181 (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975)).
13. See infra notes 26-67 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 68-129 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 131-50 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 151-203 and accompanying text.
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told a police officer that he wanted to make a statement but did not know if he
should talk to his lawyer.1 7 The police officer told Harvey that he need not
speak with his attorney because his lawyer would receive a copy of the state-
ment.18 Harvey signed a constitutional rights waiver form, initialing the por-
tions advising him of his right to remain silent, to have a lawyer present before
and during questioning, and to have a lawyer appointed for him prior to ques-
tioning. 19 He then gave a statement detailing his version of the events of the
rape.20
At trial the prosecutor used Harvey's statement to the police to impeach his
testimony on cross-examination. 2 1 The prosecutor stipulated that police had
taken the statement in violation of Harvey's Miranda rights.22 Though he con-
ceded the prosecution could not use the statement in its case-in-chief, the prose-
cutor contended he could use it for impeachment purposes.23 The trial court
allowed the impeachment, believed the victim's testimony, and found Harvey
guilty.24
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. It noted that although the state-
ment would have been admissible if taken in violation only of iiranda, the pros-
ecution could not use it as evidence, even for impeachment purposes, because it
violated Harvey's sixth amendment right to counsel.25 The Michigan Supreme
Court denied leave to appeal, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the prosecution may use a statement taken in viola-
tion of the prophylactic rule established in Michigan v. Jackson 26 to impeach a
defendant's testimony. 27 The Court held that statements taken from defendants
in violation of the Jackson rule are admissible at trial for impeachment pur-
poses.28 In so holding, the majority essentially duplicates the analysis the Court





22. Id. The police officer violated Harvey's Miranda rights by failing to establish that Harvey
had properly waived his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present. See supra note 4.
23. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1178.
24. Id. at 1178-79.
25. Id. at 1179.
26. 475 U.S. 625 (1986). Transposing the reasoning espoused in the fifth amendment case,
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the Jackson Court announced a bright-line rule that, after
a defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel has attached, any waiver of the right during a police-
initiated interrogation "is invalid." Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. The Supreme Court has developed "a
substructure of substantive, procedural and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority
from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions." Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. RFv. 1, 2-3 (1975). Such "prophylac-
tic" rules, of which the Jackson rule is one, presumably exist to deter violations of the rights they
protect. Violation of a prophylactic rule may result in the reversal of a conviction even though the
State did not violate the Constitution itself. See eg., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 & n.1
(1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653-60 (1984). See generally Grano, Prophylactic Rules
in Criminal Procedure.: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REV. 100 (1985) (defin-
ing, identifying, assessing the legitimacy of, and reinterpreting prophylactic rules).
27. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1177-78.
28. Id.
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previously employed in fifth amendment exclusionary rule cases. 29
The Harvey Court first outlined the jurisprudence surrounding the sixth
amendment. 30 The Court then emphasized that Harvey had a sixth amendment
right to the presence of counsel at the time he gave the statement and that the
police had violated the rule established in Jackson.3 1 Explaining the holding in
Jackson, the Court noted that Jackson's roots lie in the Miranda decision and its
progeny. 32 To safeguard the fifth amendment rights of criminal suspects against
self-incrimination, the Court in Miranda imposed a prophylactic standard re-
quiring police officers to advise suspects of their rights before interrogation. 33 In
Edwards v. Arizona,34 the Court added a second layer of protection to the Mi-
randa rules by holding that a suspect's later response to further police interroga-
tion will not establish a valid waiver of the suspect's fifth amendment rights,
even if police have advised the suspect of his rights a second time. Jackson's
ruling invalidating any waiver of sixth amendment rights pursuant to a police-
initiated conversation, the Court noted, simply superimposed the Edwards anal-
ysis onto the sixth amendment.3 5 The Supreme Court explained that it based
the rule in Jackson, like Edwards, on the presumption that suspects who assert
their right to counsel are unlikely to waive that right later.36
Furthering its analogy to the fifth amendment exclusionary rule, the Court
next observed that it already had decided that statements taken in violation of
the Miranda rules are admissible for impeachment purposes.37 It cited its rea-
soning in Harris v. New York 38 that, although the prosecution may not build a
case on illegally obtained evidence, a defendant assumes an obligation to speak
truthfully once he exercises his right to testify on his own behalf.3 9
The Court then held that statements in violation of the Jackson rule war-
rant treatment identical to that the majority had prescribed in Edwards because
the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule is essentially the same in both fifth and
sixth amendment contexts.4° Both are designed to ensure voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent waivers of the constitutional rights they protect.4 1 The Court
reiterated that involuntary statements are the only reliable evidence that a court
always should exclude.4 2 Moreover, the Court insisted that it has never pre-
vented the use of voluntary, though illegal, statements, particularly when the
29. See, eg., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
30. Harvey, 110 S. CL at 1179 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 1180.
32. Id.
33. Id. For a discussion of Miranda rights, see supra note 4.
34. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
35. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1180.
36. Id.
37. Id. (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971)).
38. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). See infra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
39. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1180.
40. Id. at 1181.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979)).
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violations relate only to procedural safeguards rather than constitutional
rights.43 In such cases, the Court held, the search for truth outweighs the possi-
bility that exclusion of the evidence might deter future police misconduct. 44 Be-
cause the police violated only a prophylactic rule, and not a constitutional right,
the Court found a balancing analysis of exclusion permissible in Harvey, and
reversed the appellate court by holding that the prosecutor could use evidence
taken in violation of the Jackson rule to impeach Harvey's testimony.45
The Harvey Court rejected the defendant's argument that sixth amendment
cases require a different rule than that employed in fifth amendment cases. Har-
vey argued that because a Jackson violation occurs after commencement of the
adversarial process, police interrogation thus implicates the constitutional guar-
antee of the sixth amendment itself.4 6 The Court responded by noting that
nothing prevents a defendant from voluntarily choosing to speak with police
without the presence of his attorney.47 The defendant may execute a valid
waiver of his right to counsel.
The majority recognized that once a defendant has exercised his right to the
presence of counsel, analysis of the waiver issue changes. Any change in the
analysis, however, results from the need to consider the Jackson prophylactic
rule's operation, which commands that interrogation must cease until an attor-
ney is present.48 The Court rejected implicitly the defendant's assertion that the
waiver analysis changed as a result of a direct implication of the sixth amend-
ment right. Despite operation of the rule, the Court asserted, a defendant can
still waive his right to counsel under certain circumstances. 49
Finally, the majority rejected the defendant's alternative assertion that the
police conduct was so egregious that it rendered the statement inadmissible for
any purpose. Because the record was incomplete, the Court found it impossible
to determine whether Harvey's waiver was knowing and voluntary. By refusing
to comment on the application of their analysis in Harvey to statements resulting
from an involuntary waiver of an accused's right to counsel, the Court carefully
left open the question of whether evidence obtained in direct contravention of
the sixth amendment could be used for impeachment purposes.50
Justice Stevens wrote a bitter dissent, chastising the majority for couching
its opinion in the language of a prophylactic rule. Justice Stevens admonished







49. Id. at 1181-82. The Harvey Court did not specify the conditions under which an accused
may make a valid waiver of his right to counsel after he has invoked it, but did indicate that defend-
ant-initiated contact with the police would be an adequate waiver. The Court did not address other
methods of valid waiver. But see Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988) (defendant's waiver of
Miranda rights sufficient to establish waiver of right to counsel).
50. The Supreme Court did note, however, that the Michigan courts were free to address the
issue on remand, indicating that additional facts showing involuntary waiver may have persuaded
the Court to rule in Harvey's favor. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1182; see infra note 155.
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obtained ev'idence violates the sixth amendment whether the prosecution uses
evidence for impeachment purposes or for its case-in-chief.51 Like the majority,
Justice Stevens began by reviewing the Court's decisions regarding the treatment
of the fifth and sixth amendment exclusionary rules. He focused, however, on
the differences between the rule's application in fifth and sixth amendment con-
texts, rather than the similarities.
Justice Stevens remarked that the fifth amendment protects against self-
incrimination; the Miranda rules "primarily safeguard that right against the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." '52 Moreover, he acknowledged
that Edwards created an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's waiver of
his privilege against compelled self-incrimination in a police-initiated conversa-
tion is invalid.53 However, when the suspect initiates the interrogation he volun-
tarily waives his right and, consequently, no fifth amendment concern remains.54
In contrast, Justice Stevens noted that the sixth amendment is much more
pervasive than the fifth amendment because it exists to protect the ability of the
accused to assert any other rights he may have.55 Sixth amendment concerns
remain, therefore, even absent the presumption that a defendant's waiver of his
sixth amendment right is invalid.56 The guarantee of assistance at trial to pro-
tect those remaining rights applies equally whether the defendant is presenting
his case or the prosecution is impeaching the defendant's testimony.57
Justice Stevens admitted the majority correctly explained that the Jackson
Court based its opinion in part on fifth amendment concerns, extending the Ed-
wards protections to the sixth amendment context.58 He reminded the majority,
however, that the Jackson holding also is rooted explicitly in the Court's previ-
ous holdings that the defendant is entitled "'to rely on counsel as a "medium"
between him and the State' whenever the State attempts to deliberately elicit
information from him."5 9 Once an accused invokes his right, the Constitution
protects the attorney-client relationship. 6° Moreover, Justice Stevens argued,
51. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1183 (Stevens, 3., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun joined the dissent.
52. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966)).
53. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
An accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component of our crimi-
nal justice system. Lawyers in criminal cases "are necessities not luxuries." Their presence
is essential because they are the means through which the other rights of the person on trial
are secured. Without counsel, the right to a trial itself would be "of little avail," as this
Court has recognized repeatedly. "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to
be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any
other rights he may have."
Id. at 1183 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54
(1984)) (citations omitted).
56. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1184 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1185 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)) (citations
omitted).
60. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 290 n.3 (1988)).
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the right to counsel is not limited to interrogations that produce evidence for the
prosecution's case-in-chief, but extends to all efforts to elicit information from
the defendant. 61
Justice Stevens faulted the majority for analogizing Harvey to the panoply
of cases in which the Court has held that impeachment is permissible because
excluding faulty evidence from the case-in-chief adequately deters violations of
Miranda and the fourth amendment. 62 By doing so, the Court ignored the rea-
sons for excluding evidence taken from an indicted defendant without the pres-
ence of counsel.6 3 Exclusion of this evidence is not a remedy for a violation that
precedes trial. Rather, it occurs as a necessary incident of the sixth amendment
itself because, unlike the fourth and fifth amendments, the right to counsel exists
to preserve the right to a fair trial.64
Finally, Justice Stevens questioned the majority's failure to outline the stan-
dard for evaluating a defendant's proper waiver of his sixth amendment right.65
He noted that the Court at first seemed to hold that impeachment is always
permissible, but then later required the defendant to make a knowing and volun-
tary waiver of his right to counsel.66 Regardless of whether the Court believed
Harvey's waiver was voluntary, Justice Stevens suggested that the interview was
similar in significance to a pretrial deposition, and Harvey deserved representa-
tion at the event to avoid interference with his counsel's trial strategy.67
Harvey rests on a foundation of cases suppressing evidence on sixth amend-
ment grounds that fails to enunciate'a clear rationale for doing so. 6 8 The
Supreme Court first applied the sixth amendment exclusionary rule to pos-
tindictment communications between the accused and government agents in
Massiah v. United States.69 Massiah had retained a lawyer and was free on bail
after being indicted on narcotics charges.70 Government agents, however, con-
61. Id. at 1185-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1186 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1186-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1189 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1189-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. See Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987Supreme Court Terms,
67 T x. L. REV. 231, 283 (1988) ("A cynic might speculate that the sixth amendment right is based
on an unfortunate choice by the Court of a vehicle for extricating itself from the awkward dilemma
presented by Brewer v. Williams." (footnote omitted)); Tornkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of
the Right to CounselAgainst Informants." Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DA-
vis L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1988) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, An Adversary System] (noting a lack of an in-
depth constitutional justification for the Massiah right); Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of a Crimi-
nal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. Rv.
1137, 1164 (1987) (observing that many questions remain in any Massiah analysis); Comment, Appli-
cation of the Impeachment Exception to the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Seeking a Resolu-
tion Based on the Substance of the Right to Counsel, 50 ALa. L. RnV. 343, 376 n.241 (1986)
(asserting that the Court has never addressed adequately the purpose of suppression in sixth amend-
ment cases); see also Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and Doc-
trinal Implications, 67 N.C.L. REv. 751, 762 n.75 (1989) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, The Massiah
Right] (postulating that "[tihe Justices may well be uncertain, even confused, about the true charac-
ter of the sixth amendment exclusion").
69. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
70. Id. at 201.
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tinued to investigate him by persuading one of Massiah's cohorts to install a
radio transmitter in his car.71 Through the transmitter, the government ob-
tained damaging statements about Massiah's narcotics activities, which it intro-
duced in a trial that resulted in his conviction. 72
The Supreme Court held the government's action had denied Massiah his
sixth amendment rights. The evidence therefore was inadmissible.73 The Mas-
siah Court was especially careful to underscore its approval of police investiga-
tions to detect other criminal activity, clarifying that:
We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely
proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities.
of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defend-
ant had already been indicted. All that we hold is that the defendant's
own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the
circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the
prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.74
In his Massiah dissent, Justice White correctly predicted that the rule that
the majority established would have "wide application well beyond the facts of
this case."'75 In 1977, with Brewer v. Williams,76 the Court extended the Mas-
siah ruling to indirect custodial interrogation. 77 Finding Williams "constitu-
tionally indistinguishable" from Massiah, the Court held that a police officer
violated Williams's sixth amendment rights when he elicited incriminating state-
ments from the mentally unstable and intensely religious man in absence of his
counsel by delivering an emotional "Christian burial speech." 78 "[O]nce adver-
71. Id. at 202.03.
72. Id. at 203.
73. Id. at 206-07. The Court relied on its previous holding in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959), in which it overturned a state court first-degree murder conviction because, in the Court's
opinion, the case could not stand on fourteenth amendment grounds. The Massiah Court noted,
however, that the Court had decided Spano on a "totality of circumstances" and that, despite the
majority opinion's fourteenth amendment rationale, four of the concurring Justices pointed out that
the Constitution required reversal because the police deliberately elicited the confession from Spano
after he had been indicted, and he was therefore entitled to a lawyer. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204.
Massiah, a federal case, directly implicated the sixth amendment rather than the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court announced that Massiah was "denied the basic protections
of [his sixth amendment] guarantee when there was used against him at trial evidence of his own
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been in-
dicted and in the absence of his counsel." Id. at 206.
74. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
76. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
77. Only weeks after its ruling in Massiah, the Supreme Court issued another sixth amendment
opinion, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which found a sixth amendment violation where
the state had not initiated adversarial judicial proceedings. The Court subsequently has limited
Escobedo to its facts. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 438 (1974).
78. Williams, 430 U.S. at 406. The authorities arrested, arraigned, and committed Williams to
jail in Davenport, Iowa, for abducting a 10-year-old girl in Des Moines whose body the police had
not found. Id. at 390-91. Although the police promised Williams's lawyer that they would not
question him during the 160-mile trip back to Des Moines, shortly after the journey began, one
officer gave him "something to think about while [they were] traveling down the road." Id. at 392.
Calling him "Reverend," the officer told Williams that an impending snow storm would probably
make the girl's body impossible to find and that Williams ought to divulge the location of the body
so that the girl's parents could give her a proper "Christian burial." Id. at 392-93. Although Wil-
Hams assured his companions several times during the trip that "[w]hen I get to Des Moines and see
[Vol. 69
SIXTH AMENDMENT
sary proceedings have commenced against an individual," the majority wrote,
"he has a right to,.legal representation when the government interrogates
him."' 79 Moreover, the Court emphasized, under the waiver standard set forth
in Johnson v. Zerbst,80 the State had failed to prove that Williams intentionally
relinquished his right to counsel before responding to the police.81 Williams
solidified the Court's commitment to reviewing confession practices under the
Constitution and reaffirmed the value of a lawyer's presence during interroga-
tion.8 2 By limiting its opinion to "interrogation" contexts, 83 however, the Court
cast doubt on the lawyer's role in somewhat more surreptitious circumstances
like those present in Massiah.84
United States v. Henry 5 dispelled any doubt Williams had created about
sixth amendment protections in situations other than direct interrogation. In
Henry, the Court applied the Massiah analysis to the government's use of an
undercover agent to elicit incriminating statements from an accused being held
in jail pending trial.86 Henry made it clear that instead of protecting only the
right to counsel during interrogation, the sixth amendment contemplates that
counsel will play the role of a true advocate empowered and expected to act as a
"medium" between the defendant and the State.87
Apparently seeing an opportunity to expand and clarify its growing body of
sixth amendment jurisprudence, the Court used Maine v. Moulton 8 s to confirm
its suggestion in Henry that the State must both "deliberately elicit" and pur-
posefully provide a situation likely to produce a confession to violate the sixth
Mr. McKnight [his attorney], I am going to tell you the whole story," toward the end of the ride
Williams revealed where he had disposed of the young girl's body. Id. Williams was indicted for
first-degree murder. Id. at 393.
79. Id. at 401.
80. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court determined in Johnson that "waiver [of a fundamental
right] is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Id.
at 464.
81. Williams, 430 U.S. at 404. The majority was careful to limit its waiver analysis by noting
that Williams could have waived, without notice to counsel, his sixth amendment rights. Under the
facts presented, however, the Court determined that he did not. Id. at 405-06. It failed, however, to
specify the exact ingredients necessary for an adequate waiver under the sixth amendment. See infra
note 104 and accompanying text.
82. See Tomkovicz, An Adversary System, supra note 68, at 15.
83. Williams, 430 U.S. at 400-01.
84. See Tomkovicz, An Adversary System, supra note 68, at 15.
85. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
86. Id. at 269-75. Government agents told their informant, an inmate by the name of Nichols,
to be wary of any statements Henry might make during his incarceration, but cautioned Nichols not
to try to elicit information from Henry. Id. at 266. Unaware of Nichols's role, Henry had a conver-
sation with him in which Henry made incriminating remarks about the robbery and, upon release,
Nichols relayed the information to government agents, who paid him. Id. at 266-67. Nichols testi-
fied at Henry's trial, which resulted in Henry's conviction. Id. at 267.
87. Id. at 270-74. Although it clarified some issues, Henry also created new problems. The
opinion apparently added a second criterion to Massiah's "deliberately elicited" test. Under Henry,
the State also had to create a situation likely to elicit statements from the accused. Id. at 274. The
new condition seemed to open the door for.the State to profit from informers while escaping sixth
amendment liability as long as the confessions could not be attributed to its conduct. Tomkovicz, An
Adversary System, supra note 68, at 15-16.
88. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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amendment. 89 The facts in Moulton were similar to those of Massiah. Just
before the defendant, Moulton, and his cohort, Colson, were to appear at trial,
Colson confessed to having participated in the crimes and agreed to wear a con-
cealed body wire transmitter during an upcoming meeting with Moulton.90
Although the police instructed him not to question Moulton, Colson pretended
not to be able to recall details of their crimes, and, as a result, Moulton made
several incriminating statements, which were later admitted into evidence at
trial.91 In an opinion strongly supportive of Massiah, the Moulton Court ex-
plained that the sixth amendment right to counsel "safeguards the other rights
deemed essential for the fair prosecution of a criminal proceeding."92 The right
attaches at "critical" stages in the criminal judicial process where "the govern-
ment has committed itself to prosecute, and ... the adverse positions of the
government and defendant have solidified."
93
In 1986, the Court applied a sixth amendment analysis to facts involving
direct police interrogation in Michigan v. Jackson.94 Police arrested and ar-
raigned Jackson on murder charges.95 Before they allowed him to consult with
counsel, the police advised Jackson of his Miranda rights, interrogated him, and
obtained a confession.96 A jury convicted Jackson after the trial court admitted
the illegally obtained evidence.97 The Michigan Supreme Court held that the
lower court should have suppressed the confession because the defendant had
not made a valid waiver of his sixth amendment right to counsel. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed. 98 The Court asserted that "the reasons for
prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the
help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an
offense than before." 99 When the government has committed itself to prosecute
and the adverse positions of the State and the defendant have solidified, the
Court explained, the defendant "finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces
of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and proce-
dural criminal law." 1°°
Concluding that the sixth amendment right to counsel is as deserving of
89. See Tomkovicz, An Adversary System, supra note 68, at 18-19.
90. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162-64.
91. Id. at 165-66.
92. Id. at 169.
93. Id. at 170.
94. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
95. Id. at 628.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 628-29.
99. Id. at 631.
100. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 631 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
Gouveia involved one group of federal prison inmates whom the State had detained during the inves-
tigation of a murder of a fellow inmate for 19 months without appointed counsel until they were
indicted on federal criminal charges. Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 183. The State also detained another pair
of men for about eight months during an investigation of the murder of another inmate until they
also were indicted. Id. at 184. The Supreme Court held that before the State initiates adversarial
judicial proceedings, inmates in administrative segregation without counsel do not have a constitu-
tional right to the appointment of counsel. Id. at 192.
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procedural safeguards as the fifth amendment right,10 1 the Court applied the
rule established in the fifth amendment case Edwards v. Arizona 10 2 to sixth
amendment cases, establishing that a defendant's waiver of his sixth amendment
rights in a police-initiated conversation is invalid.10 3 The Court again failed to
address, however, whether the sixth amendment provides an accused with
greater protection than the fifth amendment, requiring a different standard for
waiver.o4
While the Court developed the contours of the exclusionary rule in sixth
amendment contexts, it simultaneously created exceptions to its use of the rule
in fourth and fifth amendment cases.105 Among other exceptions,10 6 the Court
allowed the prosecution to use evidence obtained in violation of the fourth and
fifth amendments for impeachment purposes. Until Harvey, however, it had not
addressed whether the government could impeach a defendant with evidence
obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
The Supreme Court first created a fourth amendment impeachment excep-
tion in Walder v. United States,l0 7 some ten years prior to its recognition of a
sixth amendment exclusionary rule in Massiah. To rebut the defendant's asser-
tion that he never purchased, sold, or possessed narcotics, the prosecution intro-
duced testimony of an officer who had participated in a prior, illegal search of
Walder's property that had resulted in an incriminating heroin capsule. The
chemist who had analyzed the capsule also testified. The jury convicted Walder
after the judge admitted the testimony with a limiting instruction to the jury that
it could consider the evidence only for purposes of impeaching the defendant's
101. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 632.
102. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). The Edwards Court mandated that, in addition to the safeguards
established in Miranda, the Court would presume that after a suspect has invoked his fifth amend-
ment right to counsel, any waiver of those rights is invalid when he responds to subsequent police
interrogation, even if he has been advised of his rights. Id. at 484.
103. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
104. Indeed, the Court continued to defer judgment on the issue of adequate waiver for quite
some time. In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986), the Court explicitly left open the question of
whether the fifth amendment waiver operates as a general waiver of parallel rights under the sixth
amendment. Id. at 428 n.2. But in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), the Court announced
that by admonishing an accused of his Miranda rights, the state sufficiently met the burden of show-
ing that the accused made a valid waiver of his right to counsel at a postindictment interrogation.
Id. at 292-93; see infra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the waiver standard in sixth
amendment cases).
105. Some justices considered the exceptions overly broad. See, eg., Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222, 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was clearly concerned that creation of
numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule would seriously undermine the achievement of the
deterrent objective of the rule. Id. (Brennan J., dissenting). The majority confirmed his fears with a
strongly written opinion in Oregon v. Hass, calling it a mere "speculative possibility" that deterrence
would be hindered. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975). Brennan, again dissenting in Hass,
continued his vigilant campaign for deterrence, arguing that the ruling in Hass "goes beyond Harris
in undermining Miranda." Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. The Court has created numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule in addition to the
impeachment exception. See, eg., Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (good faith ex-
ception); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (inevitable discovery exception); Segura v. United
States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (independent source exception); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980) ("standing" restriction); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (attenuation
exception).
107. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
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credibility. 108
In Waider, the Supreme Court considered whether the defendant's denial of
ever having possessed drugs "opened the door" for the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence to attack his credibility. 109 The Court responded to this novel
question in a scant opinion of five pages by reiterating its position that the Con-
stitution does not permit use of illegally obtained evidence to support any part of
the prosecution's case-in-chief.110 Even so, the Court admonished using the ex-
clusionary rule as "a shield against contradiction of [the defendant's] un-
truths"11' and described such use of the rule as a "perversion of the Fourth
Amendment."' 12 Use of illegally obtained evidence was therefore permissible to
impeach the credibility of the defendant's testimony.
Similarly, the Court created an exception to the fifth amendment exclusion-
ary rule in Harris v. New York.'1 3 The State had indicted Harris twice for sell-
ing heroin to an undercover police officer." 4 At his trial, Harris denied making
the sale. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Harris about state-
ments he made immediately following the arrest, but before the police read him
his Miranda rights, that suggested he did sell heroin to the officer." 5 Despite
defense counsel's objection, the judge admitted the evidence with a limiting in-
struction to the jury. Nonetheless, the jury found Harris guilty of selling illegal
drugs." 16
Admitting that Miranda suggests that uncounseled statements are inadmis-
sible for any purpose, the Harris Court dismissed this proposition as dictum and
instead drew an analogy between Walder v. United States and the case before
it.117 The Court noted that, as was the case in Walder, "[tihe impeachment
process provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing Harris's credibility."" 18 It
concluded that excluding illegally obtained evidence from the prosecution's
case-in-chief sufficiently deters wrongful police conduct. 19 Thus, the Court de-
clared, "[tihe shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to
use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior
108. Id. at 62-64.
109. Id. at 64.
110. Id. at 65 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (state cannot support a
conviction based on evidence it obtained through leads from unlawfully obtained evidence));
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (indirect use of violative evi-
dence in case not permissible); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (government cannot
use fruits of unlawful search and seizure to secure conviction)). Walder actually repudiated even
stronger language in Silverthorne, which stated that the exclusionary rule not only commands that
illegally seized evidence "shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."
Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
111. Wader, 347 U.S. at 65.
112. Id.
113. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
114. Id. at 222-23.
115. Id. at 223.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 224.





Confronted with a variation of the fact pattern presented in Harris, the
Court next applied its impeachment exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule
in Oregon v. Hass.12 1 Police arrested Hass for bicycle theft and after requesting
counsel, Hass pointed out a place in the brush where he and his cohorts had
hidden one of the bicycles and also discussed the location of the houses from
which he had stolen the bikes. 122 In rebuttal to Hass's assertion at trial that he
did not know the location of the houses, the prosecution recalled the arresting
police officer, who testified that Hass had pointed out the houses. 123
The Supreme Court used Hass to refine its emerging balancing analysis of
the impeachment exception. The majority noted that it saw no difference be-
tween its application of the principles outlined in Harris and their application to
Hass's case. 124 The Court weighed the value of allowing the jury to consider the
evidence in assessing the defendant's credibility against the possible deterrent
effect of withholding wrongfully obtained statements from the jury at any stage
of the trial. 125 It concluded that the evidence's worth to the jury outweighed the
value of withholding it because the statement's exclusion from the case-in-chief
already had served deterrence interests adequately. 126
More importantly, however, the Court used Hass as an opportunity to ex-
pand on its earlier declaration in Harris that defendants should not be able to
employ the exclusionary rule as a license to testify perjuriously with impu-
nity. 127 "We are, after all," the majority opined, "always engaged in a search
for truth.., so long as the search is surrounded with the safeguards provided by
our Constitution." 128 The Court saw no reason to believe that Hass's statements
were coerced or involuntary and considered Hass's environment while in cus-
tody to be no more stressful than that of any other similarly situated suspect.129
120. Id. at 226.
121. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
122. Id. at 715-16.
123. Id. at 717.





129. Id. at 722-23. The only difference between Hass and Harris, the Court asserted, was that
Hass's Miranda warnings were proper and Harris's were not. Valid or not, the Court surmised, the
warnings serve their deterrent effect because police officers will be unaware of the defect. Id. at 723.
The Court therefore labeled the Oregon Supreme Court's contention that officers would have incen-
tive to continue interrogating suspects to obtain impeachment evidence a mere "speculative possibil-
ity." Id. Moreover, it said that the Harris decision had struck the balance where the defective
warnings presumably presented officers with more incentive to continue questioning Harris than in
the case before them. The Hass Court therefore was not disposed to alter that balance. Id. The
Court conceded, however, that if a case arose in which the officer's conduct amounted to abuse, then
its holding might be different. Given Hass's fact pattern, however, the Court held that his state-
ments were admissible to impeach the credibility of his testimony on the stand. Id. at 723-24.
The Court further extended the bounds of the impeachment exception in fourth amendment
cases in United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). This time the Court held that the prosecution
could use evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights to impeach a
defendant's statements in response to cross-examination reasonably suggested by direct testimony.
Id. at 627-28. At trial, Havens took the stand in defense against drug smuggling charges and testi-
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Thus, prior to Harvey, the Court had established an exclusionary rule that
operated to prohibit evidence obtained in violation of the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments, but had allowed an impeachment exception only in fourth and
fifth amendment cases. Impeachment served the indispensable function of
preventing defendants from using the State's error in collecting evidence as an
opportunity to lie on the witness stand. The usefulness of the impeachment ex-
ception, under most circumstances, far outweighed the deterrent function the
exclusionary rule served. Harvey creates an identical impeachment exception to
the sixth amendment exclusionary rule, which the Court reasoned is equally
necessary to discourage perjury in right to counsel cases. The Harvey majority
saw no distinction between the rights at stake under the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments and, therefore, deemed separate exclusionary rules analyses unnec-
essary. Because the sixth amendment protects the right to a fair trial, however,
many have argued that its exclusionary rule deserves unique consideration. 130
Debate surrounding the exclusionary rule always has been fertile. The
Constitution does not mandate the rule explicitly; rather, it is a judicially created
remedy implemented to safeguard constitutional rights.131 The Supreme Court
has advanced several justifications for the rule, 132 but has elevated the rule's
fled that he had not "engage[d] in that kind of activity" with his cohort, McLeroth. Id. at 622. On
cross-examination, the prosecution asked him whether he had participated in sewing pockets in
MeLeroth's shirt and whether he had a tee-shirt with pieces missing in his luggage when he entered
the country. Upon Havens's negative reply, the court admitted into evidence a tee-shirt that Cus-
toms officials had seized illegally from his luggage. Id. at 622-23. Although the court admonished
the jury to consider the shirt only when weighing the credibility of Havens's testimony, the jury
found him guilty. Id. at 623. Prior to Havens, the Court had recognized only impeachment of direct
testimony as acceptable. Charging that the appellate court misapprehended the underlying rationale
of Walder, Harris, and Hass, the Court explained that in Walder the controlling considerations were
the prosecution's use of a remotely related utterance to introduce the illegal evidence. Id. at 625.
The relationship of the tee-shirt to Havens's illicit activities was far more direct, the Court suggested.
Id. at 626. Once again balancing considerations of truth against deterrence, the Court announced
that even though neither Harris nor Hass involved impeachment of testimony first given on cross-
examination, the reasoning of those cases still applied in Havens. Id. Defendants are expected to
testify truthfully or withstand the consequences and the State must be allowed to question him
properly. Id. at 626-27. Moreover, the Court declared, the incremental deterrence that exclusion of
such evidence would yield is insufficient, as was the case in Harris and Hass, to require that false
testimony go unchallenged. Id. at 627. Impeachment of a defendant's testimony on cross-examina-
tion using illegally obtained evidence, therefore, was permissible. Id. at 628-29.
130. See infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
131. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 638 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Courts and commentators generally have divided into two camps. One school of thought
contends that the Constitution requires the rule to guarantee the defendant's procedural rights.
Thus, in the sixth amendment context, the state violates the gravamen of the accused's right when it
admits the illegal evidence at trial. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (holding that
there is a "'public safety' exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a
suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence... ") (emphasis added); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 445 (1974) (declaring that in fifth amendment cases "statements taken in violation of the
Miranda principles must not be used to prove the prosecution's case at trial") (emphasis added);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (holding that in sixth amendment cases, "the
defendants own incriminating statements.., could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution
as evidence against him at his trial"); see also Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusion-
ary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251, 289-307 (1974) (affirming the view
that there is a single evidentiary transaction encompassing search, seizure and use that compels a
court to recognize exclusion as a fourth amendment right). The other camp views the rule as a
judicially created remedy required by the Constitution, but applicable only in situations in which the
rule noticeably will deter police officers from future violations. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
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deterrent function as its primary purpose in recent years. Even so, debate over
the effectiveness of the rule as a deterrent to wrongful police conduct has contin-
ued, most often from the pages of dissenting opinions.133 The competing justifi-
cations for the rule have combined to create an erratic body of law refining its
application.
Because the Court has interpreted the rule in fourth and fifth amendment
contexts as deterrence-based, rather than rights-based,134 it has been able to cre-
ate an impeachment exception to combat defendants who perjure themselves
freely on the witness stand believing that their constitutional rights will prevent
the contradictory evidence from becoming part of the case against them. 135
Although the government's conduct in acquiring unlawfully obtained evidence
in these cases is always a consideration, the Court has deflated the deterrent
effect on police of excluding evidence used for the limited purpose of impeach-
ment. Instead, it has placed primary importance on its declaration that a de-
fendant should not be able to "'turn the illegal method by which the evidence
... was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against
contradiction of his untruths.' "136
Under this deterrence-based analysis, the Supreme Court has found only
one fifth amendment case compelling enough to deny use of wrongfully obtained
evidence against a defendant at any stage of his trial. In New Jersey v.
Portash,137 the defendant previously had appeared before a grand jury under a
grant of immunity. Before the grand jury, Portash either had to testify or face
contempt charges. The State later sought to introduce Portash's grand jury tes-
timony for impeachment purposes at his trial on charges of in-office misconduct
and extortion by a public official. 138 The Supreme Court held that the defend-
309 (1985) (qualifying exclusionary rule in Miranda case); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910
(1984) (fourth amendment); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974.) (Miranda); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (describing the rule as a "judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect"); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1949) (stating that in fourth amendment cases "the exclusion of evi-
dence is a remedy which directly serves only to protect those upon whose person or premises some-
thing incriminating has been found"); see also Stuart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 1365, 1383-89 (1983) (fourth amendment exclusionary rule is not a right but a constitution-
ally required remedy because it is the most effective way to protect against police misconduct).
Courts sometimes have advanced a third rationale that judicial integrity requires courts to ex-
clude tainted evidence to prevent the court from becoming an accessory to other arms of government
that obtained evidence without regard for an individual's rights. See United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recently, however, the Court has not argued this
theory seriously. Loewy, Police-Obtained Evidence and the Constitution: Distinguishing Unconstitu-
tionally Obtained Evidence From Unconstitutionally Used Evidence, 87 Mich. L. REv. 907, 907 n.1
(1989). Indeed, one commentator recently has proposed that exclusion actually may be a combined
deterrent safeguard and right. See Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right, supra note 68, at 765 n.89. But
see Comment, supra note 68, at 376 n.241 ("If the purpose of [exclusion] is to protect the accused's
right to a fair trial, it conflicts with the deterrence rationale ...
133. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 132 for a discussion of competing rationales for the exclusionary rule.
135. See supra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
136. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S.
62, 65 (1954)).
137. 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
138. Id. at 452. Ultimately Portash did not testify, but the Court addressed the question of
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ant's grand jury statements were the "essence" of coerced testimony, directly
implicating the constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination "in
its most pristine form."' 139 Balancing, therefore, was not only unnecessary, but
impermissible.14  The Court forbade a Harris or Hass analysis and held that the
grand jury testimony constitutionally could not become any part of Portash's
subsequent criminal proceeding. 141
In contrast to its reasoning in fourth and fifth amendment exclusionary rule
cases, somewhat different considerations guided the Court's line of cases devel-
oping a sixth amendment exclusionary rule. Indeed, its reasoning in these cases
more closely resembles its analysis of the rights at stake in Portash. As in
Portash, the Court's recognition of a direct violation of the constitutional right
at issue was central to the decisions in Massiah v. United States and its prog-
eny.142 All the early sixth amendment opinions contained language indicating
that the State had violated a constitutional right rather than a mere prophylactic
rule. 14 3 In each case, the government had violated the core value of the sixth
amendment-the right to a fair trial-by introducing wrongfully obtained
evidence.
Moreover, none of the defendants in right-to-counsel exclusion cases had
full control over their decisions to give statements to the authorities because
their evidence-gathering tactics all were similarly surreptitious.144 Although the
Court took pains to say that the precise manner in which the State acquired the
information was constitutionally irrelevant,1 45 it seemed influenced by the rela-
whether the prosecution could use his compelled testimony in the grand jury investigation against
him at trial nonetheless. Id.
139. Id. at 459.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 459-60.
142. See supra notes 69-104 and accompanying text. In Portash the Court rejected the State's
request to apply the Harris and Hass balancing analysis because it had "overlooked a crucial distinc-
tion ... that the defendant[s] [in those cases] made 'no claim that the statements made to the police
were coerced or involuntary.'" Portash, 440 U.S. at 458 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
224 (1971)).
143. See, eg., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) ("To allow the admission of evidence
obtained from the accused in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights... risks the evisceration of
the... right recognized in Massiah."); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) ("[W]e
conclude that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Henry's statements.., should not
have been admitted at trial. By intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to make
incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.") (footnote omitted); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397-98 (1977)
("[fit is clear that... Williams was deprived of... the right to assistance of counsel. This right...
is indispensable to the fair administration of our adversary system of criminal justice."); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that petitioner "was denied the basic protections of
[the sixth amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminat-
ing words"); see also supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
144. See, eg., Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177 (police used wire transmitter taped to defendant's cohort
to collect incriminating statements); Henry, 447 U.S. at 265-67 (police paid undercover informant
who was also defendant's celmate for information about crimes); Williams, 430 U.S. at 392-93 (po-
lice officer delivered "Christian burial" speech to mentally ill and intensely religious defendant to
entice him to confess); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 203 (police used a radio transmitter to overhear a
conversation between unknowing defendant and his cohort).
145. See, eg., Williams, 430 U.S. at 400 ("That the incriminating statements were elicited sur-
reptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant.").
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tively disadvantageous posture of each defendant in relation to the State. 146 The
Court's emphasis on the rights of defendants meant that majority opinions
couched in the language of deterrence or a prophylactic rule were all but absent
in sixth amendment opinions.1 47 Not surprisingly, the majority in each case
instead addressed instances of police misconduct by focusing on the defendant's
valid waiver of his right to counsel.' 48
146. See, eg., Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. The method of interroga-
tion in both Massiah and Moulton affected the ability of the defendants even to ask for the assistance
of counsel. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177; Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03. Moreover, the Court observed
that, because they were unaware of the interrogation, both of the defendants said things that perhaps
they would not have said had they been aware of the interrogation and the fact that their words one
day might be used against them at trial. See, eg., Moulton, 474 U.S. at 177 n.13. Likewise, the
Court noticed that the defendant in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 471 (1981), likely would not have
chosen to give incriminating statements had he been on notice that the psychiatric evaluation was a
"critical stage" of the proceedings against him. Id. The Court held that the police denied Smith
assistance of counsel in making the decision to submit to the examination aniI in determining pre-
cisely how the prosecution could use the results against him. Id.
Similarly, the defendant's lack of control in Williams, 430 U.S. at 404, notably influenced the
Court. That the police knew Williams to be mentally ill and very religious put the police officers at
an unfair advantage by allowing them to use the information about the defendant to manipulate him
into revealing the location of his victim's body. Id. at 407 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Detective
Leming consciously and knowingly set out to violate Williams' Sixth Amendment right .... ).
The Williams Court saw no constitutional distinction between the circumstances of Williams
and those of Massiah. Id. at 400. Both defendants were under indictment, both had retained coun-
sel, and the government deprived both of their right to counsel when the police deliberately elicited
statements from them which the prosecution later introduced at trial. Id.
147. The Massiah Court carefully distinguished between use at trial of incriminating statements
obtained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel, which it condemned, and the investigations
themselves. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964). Similarly, the Williams Court
announced that the surreptitious method of the investigation is constitutionally irrelevant. Williams,
430 U.S. at 400.
148. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-97 (1988); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
630-35 (1986); Williams, 430 U.S. at 401-06. Although all the Justices agreed that an accused could
waive the right to counsel, none of them seemed to agree on how or under what circumstances one
could make a valid waiver. Beginning with Williams, the Justices engaged in a lengthy debate over
the essential elements of waiver. The Williams Court preferred the strictest of constitutional stan-
dards for waiver, announcing that the State must prove" 'an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege.'" Williams, 430 U.S. at 404 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Chief Justice Burger dissented, admonishing the Court for applying this
standard and reiterating from previous cases that "an intelligent act 'done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences'" sufficed to establish waiver. Id. at 418
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting MeMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970)).
In Jackson, the Court announced that, whatever constituted a valid waiver, written waivers
after a request for counsel were insufficient. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 635. The Jackson decision elicited
a caustic response from Justice Rehnquist. In his dissent, he argued that the only analytically consis-
tent reading of Jackson required that the new rule apply regardless of whether the defendant had
requested counsel. Id. at 640-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This, he concluded, was surely not the
standard the Jackson Court had intended to create. Id. at 640 (Rehnquist, ., dissenting).
Not until Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), did the Court clearly establish a standard by
which to evaluate effective waivers in sixth amendment cases. As they had done so many times
before, the Justices looked to the jurisprudence surrounding the fifth amendment for a standard they
could apply. In Patterson, the Court announced that "by admonishing petitioner with the Miranda
warnings... petitioner's waiver of his right to counsel at the questioning was valid." Id. at 293.
The Court recognized, however, that there would be times when a valid waiver under Miranda
would not suffice for sixth amendment purposes. Id. at 296 n.9 ("For example, we have permitted a
Miranda waiver to stand where a suspect was not told that his lawyer was trying to reach him during
questioning; in the Sixth Amendment context, this waiver would not be valid.").
Several factors contributed to the Court's decision to apply the Miranda standard to sixth
amendment waivers. Concern about police misconduct and the integrity of the truth-seeking pro-
cess, however, did not seem to be among them. Instead, the Patterson Court took an approach they
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Thus, the Court largely left balancing considerations of judicial integrity
and deterrence out of its analysis while refining the exclusionary rule's applica-
tion in sixth amendment contexts. Instead, emphasis on the constitutional rights
of the defendant controlled the analysis of the Court. Although police miscon-
duct and a court's ability to discern the truth continued to appear as issues in
both majority and dissenting opinions, the Court, in large part, subordinated
these issues in right to counsel cases. 149 As a result, the sixth amendment exclu-
sionary rule remained a much more potent force than its extremely limited
counterpart in fourth and fifth amendment contexts.150
Harvey, however, marks the majority's attempt to steer away from a rights-
based exclusionary rule analysis, toward the balancing analysis it had applied in
earlier fourth amendment and Miranda cases. To declare a balancing analysis
permissible in Harvey, the majority had to address the rights-based focus of the
previous sixth amendment exclusionary rule cases. To do this, the Harvey Court
characterized the fifth amendment decision in Edwards v. Arizona as "another
prophylactic rule designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into
waiving his previously asserted... rights."15 1 Because the Court drew Michi-
defined as being far more pragmatic. Id. at 298. This approach was rights-centered, nonetheless. To
decide the waiver question, the Court asked "what purposes a lawyer can serve at the particular
stage of the proceedings in question, and what assistance he could provide to an accused at that
stage" to determine the scope of the sixth amendment right. Id.
149. See, eg., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980) ("This is not a case where...
'the constable... blundered'; rather, it is one where the 'constable' planned an impermissible inter-
ference with the right to the assistance of counsel.") (quoting People v. DeFore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (1926)); illiams, 430 U.S. at 406 ("The pressures on state executive and judicial
officers charged with the administration of criminal law are great .... But it is precisely the predict-
ability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Consti-
tution extends to us all."). Compare Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 ("We do not question that.., it was
entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant ....
All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements... could not constitutionally
be used ... against him at his trial.") (emphasis in original) with id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting) ("I
am not at all convinced that the additional barriers to the pursuit of truth which the Court today
erects rest on anything like the solid foundations which decisions of this gravity should require.").
150. Prior to Harvey, the Court had resolved only one sixth amendment claim by creating an
exception to its exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) [hereinafter Williams If],
was actually a continuation of the Williams "Christian burial" case. The Court previously had
declared that the police officer in Williams directly violated the defendant's sixth amendment right
to counsel when he embarked on his "Christian burial" speech, in absence of counsel, which presum-
ably led Williams to reveal the location of his victim's body. On this basis, the Court had ruled
Williams's statements inadmissible. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 400-01, 405-06; see also supra notes
76-84 and accompanying text. When the case came back for a second time, therefore, the Court had
to consider an exception to the exclusionary rule despite its previous ruling. It employed a balancing
analysis, weighing deterrence interests against interests in seeking truth at trial to arrive at an "inevi-
table discovery" exception. Williams II, 467 U.S. at 442-43. Because the police inevitably would
have discovered the girl's body as a result of a lawful search that was underway at the time Williams
led the police to the body, the Court held that the trial court should have excluded the physical
evidence. Id. at 446-48. After applying the balancing analysis, the Court then addressed the defend-
ant's contention that exclusion in a sixth amendment case, unlike the fourth amendment, is not a
deterrent, but a present protection of the right to a fair trial. Id. at 446. Instead of rejecting or
affirming Williams's assertion, the Court skirted the issue by declaring that, even if exclusion is
rights-based, an inevitable discovery exception is consistent with that right. By doing so, the Court
effectively avoided an issue it was unprepared to address: whether sixth amendment exclusion is a
right or a remedy. See Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right, supra note 68, at 764-65; Wasserstrom &
Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 Am. CRiM. L. REV.
85, 177 n.514 (1984).
151. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1180.
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gan v. Jackson's sixth amendment rule from Edwards, it similarly labeled the
Jackson rule as "prophylactic."' 152 Balancing was appropriate, therefore, be-
cause the police violated only a rule, not a constitutional right.15 3 Moreover, the
Court emphatically denied ever having prevented use by the prosecution of rele-
vant, voluntary statements by a defendant, calling Jackson infringements "viola-
tions [that] relate only to procedural safeguards that are 'not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution.' "154 In Harvey, the Court once again was con-
cerned that the exclusionary rule allows defendants to benefit by perverting the
shield provided by the exclusionary rule" 'into a license to use perjury by way of
a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances.' -155
By shifting its focus from the rights that the sixth amendment provides, and
instead elevating the importance of a court's ability to determine the truth, the
majority severely mischaracterizes the nature of the sixth amendment exclusion-
ary rule. Unlike its fourth and fifth amendment counterparts, the sixth amend-
ment's rule operates to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial.' 56 It both
protects substantive and procedural trial interests and guards against similar
harms.' 5 7 Although uncounseled solicitation is essential to a sixth amendment
violation, the State does not deprive an accused completely of his right to coun-
sel until it uses the products of the illegal encounter against him at trial.' 58 A
court excludes wrongfully obtained evidence from the case-in-chief because its
152. Id. at 1181.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
155. Id. at 1182 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)). One might also inter-
pret the Court's opinion in Harvey as limited only to violations of the Jackson prophylactic rule,
rather than the sixth amendment exclusionary rule established in Masiah. Under this interpreta-
tion, the pure sixth amendment exclusionary rule presumably is not at issue in Harvey. Indeed, the
majority also seems satisfied with reserving opinion on whether the sixth amendment rule itself may
be subjected to a balancing analysis because it notes that "we need not consider the admissibility for
impeachment purposes of a voluntary statement obtained in absence of a knowing and voluntary
waiver of the right to counsel." Id. The Jackson rule however, like the exclusionary rule developed
in Massiah and its progeny, is an integral part of the constitutional right it protects such that admis-
sion of evidence that violates the Jackson rule is as egregious a constitutional error as admitting
evidence that violates the sixth amendment directly. See infra notes 156-67 and accompanying text.
Even if one concedes that the Court limits Harvey to apply only to the Jackson prophylactic rule,
Harvey's precedent sets an attractive stage for conservative members of the Court to sever com-
pletely the sixth amendment exclusionary rule from the right it protects by sanctioning a balancing
analysis on facts indicating that an accused made a voluntary statement after police had obtained a
technically invalid waiver.
156. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) ("As a general matter, it is through counsel that all
other rights of the accused are protected."); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986)
("Without counsel the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is through
counsel that the accused secures his other rights.") (citations omitted); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S.
159, 169 (1985) ("Mhe right to counsel safeguards the other rights deemed essential for the fair
prosecution of a criminal proceeding."); United States v. Cronc, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) ("Their
presence is essential because they are the means through which the other rights of the person on trial
are secured."); see also Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedures, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8
(1956) ("Of all the rights a person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.").
157. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right, supra note 68, at 769.
158. Id. Previous sixth amendment exclusionary rule cases support this interpretation of the
nature of the right. See supra notes 68-104 and accompanying text.
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admission would deprive the defendant of his right to rely on counsel to preserve
and defend other rights the Constitution confers upon him.15 9 Because the sixth
amendment protects any other rights a defendant may have, allowing evidence
exclusively for impeachment purposes fails to rescue the defendant's right to a
fair trial from the precarious position it occupies when the court admits the
evidence in the case-in-chief.1 60 An accused forced to rely on his own capabili-
ties in his dealings with the State unwittingly may discard rights only his lawyer
can recognize and preserve, which may later return to haunt him in both the
prosecution's case-in-chief and its rebuttal.1 61
Harvey presumably made this mistake by discussing the details of the rape
without first reviewing all of the facts he previously had given the authorities. 162
Had his lawyer been present, he would have made sure that Harvey knew he had
to give an entire account of the event.163 Regardless of whether the court admit-
ted his statement as part of the case-in-chief or on rebuttal, Harvey proffered the
evidence under unfavorable conditions that denied him the protections the Con-
stitution affords him. Instead of compensating Harvey for his loss, however, the
Michigan trial court imposed the consequences of his deprivation upon him by
allowing the damaging statements to impeach his credibility at trial. Threatened
once, Harvey's right to a fair trial suffered upon admission of evidence his sixth
amendment rights should have excluded.
Although the exclusionary rule may also operate to deter wrongful police
conduct, its primary status is as a necessary incident of the sixth amendment
itself.164 Because of the unique standing of exclusion as part of an individual's
sixth amendment rights, it follows that safeguards established to protect exclu-
sion enjoy the same status, despite their characterization by the Court as pro-
phylactic. Contrary to the majority's assertions in Harvey, the Jackson opinion
both affirms and protects the interests that the Massiah exclusion cases devel-
159. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 ("The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused ... the right to
rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State.").
160. See Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right, supra note 68, at 769 ([The Massiah exclusionary rule]
is not a mere regulatory scheme designed to avoid the rks of deprivation of the trial right, but a
temporal extension of sixth amendment control-an extension that is necessary to prevent actual
deprivations of the trial right.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
161. The Court vigorously has defended this proposition with regard to a defendant's representa-
tion at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), and during the appellate process,
Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 352 (1988). Indeed, the foundation of the Court's extension of the
right to counsel to pre-trial settings rests on the adversarial nature of the judicial process during
these "critical" stages, United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973), and the Court's determination
that an accused is entitled to rely on counsel to preserve his strongest possible defense. Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (acknowledging that the right to counsel "embodies a realistic
recognition of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the
prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel").
162. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1178.
163. Justice Stevens noted this in his dissent. Id. at 1190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text; see also Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right,
supra note 68, at 771-72 ("Exclusion under Massiah is a personal right, neither more nor less than an
essential element of the constitutional entitlement to counsel.") (footnote omitted); Schulhofer, Con-
fessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 889 (1981).
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oped. 165 Jackson undoubtedly establishes the bright-line rule the Harvey Court
alludes to and relies upon,16 6 but it also recognizes the State's violation of Jack-
son's sixth amendment Aghts and excludes the resulting evidence on that ba-
sis.167 The Harvey Court's attempt to deflate Jackson's importance among the
sixth amendment exclusionary rule cases is therefore inappropriate. As in previ-
ous sixth amendment exclusionary cases, the Court rooted Jackson in the rights-
based analysis of the rule.
Justice Stevens addressed the majority's departure from the rights-based
analysis in his dissent, noting that "[tihe Court's syllogism is flawed from the
beginning."' 168 He reminded the majority that, although the Court had based
Jackson in part on extending the prophylactic measures of Edwards to right to
counsel cases, the real focus of Jackson was on the defendant's "right to rely on
counsel as a 'medium' between him and the State."' 169 By criticizing the major-
ity's failure to focus on the defendant's rights, Justice Stevens appropriately
aligned Jackson with previous sixth amendment cases170 that had held for the
defendants on the basis of an individual rights analysis.
Justice Stevens's dissent marks the first attempt of the Justices subscribing
to a rights-based analysis to frame the exclusion of evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the right to counsel as a constitutional right. Commentators have argued
persuasively that the sixth amendment is a procedural, rather than substantive
right. 17 1 The State infringes upon the right, therefore, when it introduces at trial
evidence obtained without the presence of counsel. Not until then has the State
violated the core value of the amendment: the right to a fair trial.' 72 In sub-
scribing to a rights-based analysis, Justice Stevens recharacterizes exclusion of
165. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1986). The Jackson Colrt noted that
the reasons for prohibiting the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for
the help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally charged with an offense
than before... [because] the "Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the
initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a 'medium' between him and the
State."
Id. (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
166. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1179-80.
167. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636.
168. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1183 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1185 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)).
170. See supra notes 68-104 and accompanying text.
171. See, eg., Loewy, supra note 132, at 928-33. A substantive analysis of the exclusionary rule
concludes that a court excludes evidence because the police have acquired it in an unconstitutional
fashion. Exclusion is therefore thought to deter police from doing so again in the future. Id. A
procedural analysis of the rule, however, views the rule as in place because the Constitution guaran-
tees the defendant a procedural right to exclude the evidence. Id. See also Tomkovicz, The Massiah
Right, supra note 68, at 787-89; Comment, supra note 68, at 390-96. But see Comment, The Im-
peachment Exception to the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 176, 195-96
(1987) (arguing that defendant perjury is not entitled to constitutional protection so impeachment is
permissible; however, policy considerations suggest limiting the exception to instances where the
government can show reasonable motivation for intrusion unrelated to the pending indictment).
Where the emphasis is on a defendant's procedural right to have the assistance of counsel at all
critical stages of the judicial process, presumably the prosecution would violate one's constitutional
right to the assistance of counsel and the implied right to a fair trial when it introduces illegal
evidence to impeach the defendant's testimony, regardless of its reliability. See Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
172. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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wrongfully obtained evidence as endemic to the constitutional right embodied in
the sixth amendment itself. Balancing competing concerns, whether they be ju-
dicial integrity, deterrence, or a court's truth-seeking capacity, is improper. In-
deed, any use of the evidence at trial is unconstitutional.
Although use of the evidence for impeachment purposes should be as un-
constitutional as its inclusion in the case-in-chief, the Harvey court held that its
use to impeach a defendant's testimony is permissible.1 73 The Court admon-
ished that it has "never prevented use by the prosecution of relevant, voluntary
statements by a defendant," particularly when the violations relate only to a
procedural safeguard and not to constitutional rights.174 Yet, earlier in its dis-
cussion, the Court admitted that it has prevented use of probative evidence for
"all purposes" when it is coerced, citing as authority its decisions to exclude
compelled incriminating statements for impeachment purposes.1 75
However appropriate the differentiation of uses in fifth amendment cases, it
does not withstand serious criticism when one considers the sixth amendment
exclusionary rule's operation. The crux of the Court's argument in Harvey relies
on distinguishing evidence that violates only the Miranda rule from that which,
because coerced, violates the fifth amendment itself.176 The Court applied the
standard it developed in fifth amendment cases to Harvey and determined that,
because the record did not show the police had coerced Harvey's statement, his
statement fell within the realm of voluntary confessions that a court may per-
missibly introduce for impeachment purposes. 177 While it is certainly true that
the Court has prevented for all purposes only the use of involuntary statements
to date, Harvey distorts the reasons for doing so. New Jersey v. Portash and
Mincey v. Arizona exclude introduction of involuntary statements because they
directly violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, not
solely because they are coerced.1 78 In Harvey, the Court allowed the statements
because it found that they were voluntary, and thus did not fall within the pro-
hibited evidentiary category prescribed in Portash and Mincey.179 Whether the
statements were voluntary in Harvey makes little difference under a sixth
amendment analysis where the protections the right affords center on fairness at
trial, rather than coercion. Had the Court drawn the appropriate parallel, it
would have extended application of the principle, and not the holding, behind
Portash to sixth amendment contexts, which presumably warrants a different
result.
Curiously enough, Justice Stevens either declined or failed to take advan-
tage of Portash in fashioning his rights-based argument for the exclusionary rule.
173. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1181.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,459-60 (1979) and Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 398 (1978)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1181-82.
178. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459; Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398.
179. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1181-82.
[Vol. 69
SIXTH AMENDMENT
After all, Portash was one of Harvey's two predecessors' 8 0 in which the Court
explicitly rejected an impeachment exception to the rule because the confessions
directly implicated the constitutional right that the Court sought to protect by
the rule.' 8 ' The logical extension of Justice Stevens's argument parallels that of
Portash: because the sixth amendment protects the fundamental right to a fair
trial, and because introducing wrongfully obtained evidence jeopardizes this
right, allowing an impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule in Harvey
surely must implicate the constitutional right to a fair trial "in its most pristine
form."' 81 2 If impeachment with illegally obtained evidence directly endangers
the right to a fair trial, then just as in Portash, application of a balancing analysis
to resolve the issue is constitutionally impermissible. Failure to exclude the evi-
dence, therefore, cannot be considered collateral to a more fundamental
violation.' 83
Despite Justice Stevens's remarkable insight in identifying the distinctions
between the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments, he also continued to discuss the
inadequacy of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to wrongful police conduct,
even after asserting that the rule exists as a necessary condition of the sixth
amendment and not merely as a safeguard to the right.' 8 4 If exclusion of evi-
dence obtained without presence of counsel is a necessary mandate of the sixth
amendment itself, then weighing deterrent effects of the rule is presumably im-
permissible.' 85 Justice Stevens's deterrence discussion merely may reflect the
dissent's desire to rebut the majority's deterrence argument. The dissent seems
to assert that even if it conceded that Harvey does not implicate the Constitu-
tion, and balancing is therefore allowed, it still would exclude the evidence
under a balancing analysis. No one seriously contends that juries consider evi-
dence put before them with limiting instructions only for the purposes the law
allows. Rather, the entire judicial system indulges in this elaborate fiction.'8 6
180. The other is Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), where the Court deemed the police
officers involved to have employed tactics equivalent to physical coercion to obtain a confession from
their suspect. Id. at 398-402. Despite the fact that the Miranda violations became irrelevant be-
cause the State sought to introduce the confession only for impeachment purposes because of the
circumstances of the interrogation, the prosecution's use of the statements constituted denial of due
process of law. Id. at 398.
181. Portash, 440 U.S. at 459.
182. Id. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
183. Schulhofer, supra note 164, at 889.
184. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1187-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,
206 (1964); cf. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) (fifth amendment). See generally
Loewy, supra note 132 (addressing the invalidity of deterrence discussion in shith amendment exclu-
sionary rule cases).
186. The Supreme Court has been reluctant to admit that limiting instructions have their limits.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), however, the Court conceded that there was a
substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, would look to the incriminating
extrajudicial statements in determining the defendant's guilt. Id. at 137. It therefore held that the
lower court's admission of one defendant's confession in a joint trial violated the other defendant's
right of cross-examination under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. Id.; see also
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (expressly rejecting the proposition that a jury, when deter-mining the confessor's guilt, could be relied upon to ignore his confession of guilt should it find the
confession involuntary); Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) ("Moo often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of
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Jurors attach to imjieachment evidence the weight substantive evidence carries
so that impeachment evidence practically is no different than evidence the prose-
cution introduces in its case-in-chief. Although the fiction may be necessary, the
majority should have recognized the realities that operate inside the jury box
and weighed them in its balancing analysis.
Moreover, assuming that balancing is appropriate, the Court ultimately
may have placed too much emphasis on the truth-seeking function of the courts.
In doing so, it may have jeopardized seriously the exclusionary rule's deterrent
function. In light of Harvey, police may feel freer to interrogate indicted individ-
uals without regard to their sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel,
hopeful that if they receive valuable information, albeit illegal, Harvey will allow
the jury to hear it.187
Despite its shortcomings, the analysis that Justice Stevens imposes on the
sixth amendment exclusionary rule forcefully recalls the Court's original words
in Massiah v. United States, where it held that "the use in evidence against him
of incriminating statements" violates a defendant's constitutional rights.188 The
Court's opinion in Massiah indicated a willingness to analyze the sixth amend-
ment as a procedural right, prohibiting the use of unconstitutional evidence but
not its procurement.' 89 Until recently, the Court had not strayed from its origi-
nal holding in Massiah, distinguishing the theory behind the sixth amendment
cases from the balancing approach of the fourth and fifth amendment cases that
followed. 190 The assertion of the majority in Harvey, however, that allowing the
exclusionary rule to let defendants lie with impunity on the witness stand crip-
ples the fact-finding process, has gained enough support to impose a controlling
force on the Court's jurisprudence. 19 1 The prosecution's use of evidence ob-
tained in disregard of the defendant's right to counsel is admissible for impeach-
ment purposes because, according to the Harvey majority, the State violated only
a prophylactic measure to be invoked for deterrence purposes, not a constitu-
such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition
therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to de-
fendants."); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The
naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury... all practic-
ing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.").
187. Although the Supreme Court has attacked this argument, it has not rejected it completely.
See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975) (arguing that the likelihood that the government has
"little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way of possibly uncovering impeachment material"
is a "speculative possibility" but "[i]n any event, the balance was struck in Harris, and we are not
disposed to change it now").
188. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
189. Loewy, supra note 132, at 928.
190. See supra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
191. Indeed, see James v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990), a fourth amendment exclusionary rule
case decided solely on the basis of a balancing analysis. In James, however, the liberal justices
prevailed and the majority refused to expand the impeachment exception to all defense witness's
testimony. Id. at 656. The exclusionary consequence of the right to counsel, however, should have
no bearing on the Court's rationale for suppressing or admitting evidence in contradiction of the
sixth amendment. As Professor Tomkovicz has noted, "[tihe fact that the Massiah doctrine excludes
uncoerced, reliable and probative evidence should not lead us to conclude that sixth amendment
exclusion is merely a remedy, and not a constitutional right." Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right, supra
note 68, at 769 n.113.
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tional right.19 2 When exclusion of violative evidence does not deter police sig-
nificantly from engaging in similar conduct in the future, the rule is not
necessary. 193
In addition to the majority's categorization of the sixth amendment exclu-
sionary rule and the test established in Jackson as procedural safeguards, its
analysis contains other fundamental flaws. The majority's attempt to dispel Jus-
tice Stevens's argument with a discussion of waiver represents a misunderstand-
ing of the contours of the procedural rights debate. The majority retorts that,
because a defendant may effectively waive his right to counsel without first con-
sulting an attorney,194 the constitutional guarantee of the sixth amendment itself
is not implicated, even though the adversarial process has begun at the time of a
Jackson violation.195 The Court either misconstrues or chooses to ignore Justice
Stevens's appropriate assertion that, although an accused can waive his right to
counsel by initiating contact with the State, the government nonetheless violated
Harvey's sixth amendment rights when it admitted his statements as impeach-
ment evidence.' 9 6 In addition to extending the Edwards rule to the sixth amend-
ment, Jackson is "firmly and explicitly rooted" in previous sixth amendment
decisions that recognize an accused's right to rely on a lawyer in all critical
dealings with the state. 197 Jackson not only creates a bright-line rule governing
police conduct, but preserves an accused's original invocation of his right to
assistance of counsel.' 9 8 Its holding, therefore, is no less forceful than those of
other sixth amendment exclusionary rule cases. 199 Moreover, given the State's
concession that Harvey had not waived his right,2 0° the Court's reliance on the
waiver argument is particularly unconvincing.
The majority's analysis also fails to consider the more practical implications
of a sixth amendment balancing analysis. The likely impact of its decision is far-
reaching. Using evidence obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right for
impeachment will handicap counsels' ability to defend adequately, ultimately
weakening the adversarial process. It is highly likely that the prosecution later
will discredit an accused who testifies in his defense with his own uncounseled
statements. Fearful that they may open the door to unfavorable evidence, de-
fendants may decide not to testify.20 ' Moreover, it is entirely possible that state-
ments an accused makes without the presence of his lawyer may be unreliable.
For example, in an interrogation, an accused unknowingly may waive rights
192. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1181.
193. Id.
194. See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293 (1988).
195. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1181.
196. Id. at 1185 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens noted, Justice White's explanation of Jack-
son in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1988), comports with Justice Stevens's assertions. In
Patterson, Justice White described the essence of Jackson as the "[preservation of] the integrity of an
accused's choice to communicate with the police only through counsel." Id.
200. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1178. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
201. The Court has recognized that juries may be more likely to presume that a defendant who
chooses not to testify is guilty. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1978).
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only his lawyer would be astute enough to preserve. Alternatively, circum-
stances may compel an accused to confide untruthfully to his friend, who surrep-
titiously acts as an informant. He might lie to a jailhouse informant out of fear
or even because he wishes to impress his confidante.20 2
The Harvey Court's inattention to the possibility that, in sixth amendment
cases, introduction of wrongfully obtained evidence may be a constitutional
rights violation severely diminishes the holding. Instead of addressing the fine
distinctions between fifth and sixth amendment rights that require different
treatment, the Harvey Court merely succeeded in advocating its preferred ap-
proach, effectively subordinating a possible constitutional mandate to exclude
evidence in contravention of the sixth amendment, as well as its exclusionary
rule, for all purposes. As Justice Stevens scolded in his dissent,
[A]ll rules of law are prophylactic. Speed limits are an example; they
are designed to prevent accidents. The Sixth Amendment is another; it
is designed to prevent unfair trials. An argument that a rule of law
may be ignored, avoided or manipulated simply because it is "prophy-
lactic" is nothing more than an argument against the rule of law
itself.203
By choosing to treat the exclusionary rule as a mere safeguard, the Court
may well have overridden its own constitutional governor.
PATRICIA LYN HURST
202. See Comment, supra note 68, at 395.
203. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. at 1190 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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